The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

The Behavior of Federal Judges A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice Judges play a central role in the American legal system but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood even among themselves The system permits judges to be quite secretive and most of

  • Title: The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
  • Author: Lee Epstein William M. Landes Richard A. Posner
  • ISBN: 9780674049895
  • Page: 167
  • Format: Hardcover
  • Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood, even among themselves The system permits judges to be quite secretive and most of them are , so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theJudges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood, even among themselves The system permits judges to be quite secretive and most of them are , so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision making Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made.The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors as self interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non pecuniary aspects of their work In their view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional legalist theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior Ideology does figure into decision making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision making Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.

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      Published :2019-08-10T06:49:37+00:00

    About “Lee Epstein William M. Landes Richard A. Posner

    • Lee Epstein William M. Landes Richard A. Posner

      Lee Epstein William M. Landes Richard A. Posner Is a well-known author, some of his books are a fascination for readers like in the The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice book, this is one of the most wanted Lee Epstein William M. Landes Richard A. Posner author readers around the world.

    647 thoughts on “The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

    • Writing a review for Law & Politics Book Review. It's good - a synthesis of a ton of literature - and it uses an interesting theoretical perspective - the judge as worker. But I'd imagine lawyers, judges, and legal academics would learn more than a political scientist would from it


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